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|2nd Report of the Standing Committee on National
Defence, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session, "Procurement and associated processes"
(Adopted by the Committee on January 31, 2008; Presented to the House on
February 7, 2008)
Original report: http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=3240298&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=39&Ses=2"
Government response: http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=3546108&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=39&Ses=2
|1. These ten points (proposed by a Committee witness) may also be used by the Government as fundamental guiding principles in the reform of the defence procurement system.||The Government recognizes that this is an area of considerable complexity and importance. The government intends to continue reform in order to pursue a fair, open and transparent procurement process and one that ensures that the taxpayer's money is invested appropriately and diligently. (Full response available online).||
|2. The Department of National Defence investigate ways of making sole source contracting more transparent and accountable, with the aims of substantially reducing wait times for major capital projects necessary for Canada's national security.||The Government acknowledges the sensitive nature of sole-source procurement and is committed to improving Parliament's and Canadians' understanding of this process. The Government Contracts Regulations (GCRs) stipulate that competitive tendering should be the norm but do also recognize the legitimate need for the Government to sometimes enter into sole-source contracts. In fall 2007 the Government formally implemented an additional level of scrutiny to address the perception of a lack of fairness and transparency in some sole-source transactions. (Full response available online)||Sole source is typically used as a last choice and is subject to national and international trade agreements and the Government Contracts Regulations. The latter recognizes only four situations in which sole sourcing may be considered; pressing emergency, estimated expenditure does not exceed $25,000, or in certain specific situations $100,000; not in the public interest to solicit bids and only one person is capable of performing the contract.|
|3. Out of concerns for transparency and accountability, the National Defence Capability Plan be made public and tabled with the Standing Committee on National Defence by the end of the current fiscal year.||On May 12th, 2008, the Government unveiled the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS), its comprehensive plan to ensure the Canadian Forces (CF) have the people, equipment, and support they need to meet Canada's long-term domestic and international security challenges… This announcement complements the significant steps already taken by the Government to strengthen the CF. The CFDS will expand the Regular Force to 70 000 and the Reserve to 30 000, improve key CF infrastructure, increase the overall readiness of the CF and proceed with major fleet replacements projects: surface combatant ships, maritime patrol aircraft, fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft, fighter aircraft, and land combat vehicles and systems. By providing long-term funding stability to the CF and by setting the foundations for a new relationship with industry, the CFDS will allow for greater transparency and accountability in the defence procurement process.||Action on this recommendation is completed. The public has full access to the CFDS and to announcements of individual initiatives that stem from the CFDS are opened for competition or development or are completed.|
|4. Further to the basic elements of the procurement process that the Defence Capability Plan be considered a foundation of that process.||
To respond to ongoing and future requirements, the Canadian Forces are transforming and modernizing their maritime, land, air, and special operations forces to meet the challenges of the 21st century. To this end a comprehensive investment plan is being written to implement the CFDS. This plan will define resource allocation plans for equipment, personnel, infrastructure and other essential contributions necessary for the fielding of new equipment and capabilities over the next ten years.
In addition, the formulation of the investment plan is being greatly influenced by the introduction of Capability Based Planning within DND. The Department is currently completing a comprehensive comparison of current force structures and capabilities against the identified needs of the future in order to produce a new strategic capability roadmap. The roadmap will describe a range of capability alternatives and options to address any identified gaps. The alternatives and choices provided in the roadmap are expected to help decision makers to determine what the CF will need to meet the challenges of the evolving security environment. Once agreed, these capability choices will be further articulated and funded in the investment plan. The new roadmap is expected to be ready by mid to late 2008.
This recommendation was accepted and its implementation is completed.
While the Defence Investment Plan was advancing within the Department's internal governance process at the end of the fiscal year, it was approved by Treasury Board on 11 June 2009. This document provides a ten year view of defence investment. This key reference document is used to guide defence planning and internally manage programme resource allocation.
A capability based planning process (CBP) has been adopted by Defence. As part of the CBP, a first version of the strategic capability roadmap was completed in mid-2008. This roadmap was a decision support tool for production of the Investment Plan (IP). A cyclical process of revision and updating of the roadmap and investment plan is being adopted.
|5. All major crown projects valued at more than $100M proposed by the Department of National Defence be reported to the Standing Committee on National Defence for examination before the contract is awarded.||
The Government notes that the Committee has made this recommendation twice before, but remains of the view that its current reporting to Parliament on defence programs, operations and services, including its provision of information on major crown projects, is fully adequate. In the vast majority of cases, information on these projects is provided to Parliament, and is therefore available to the Committee, well before the contracting stage. To inform Parliament, the Government relies on reporting mechanisms already in place such as the tabling of Main Estimates and Reports on Priorities and Planning, in which the details of major crown projects are provided. At the request of committees, the Minister of National Defence, other Ministers and senior officials appear before Parliament to explain major crown projects proposed by the Department of National Defence.
The release of the CFDS will provide Parliament and Canadians with further insight into the Government's plans. The Government reiterates its commitment to have Ministers and officials appear to discuss all procurement projects of interest to the Committee, and we will continue to cooperate with Parliament in its oversight of defence procurement.
|6. The Government of Canada investigate ways of changing Department of National Defence procurement processes with the aim of substantially reducing procurement wait times for major defence capital projects necessary for national security. This re-evaluation should include investigating an "in-house" departmental procurement process (i.e. a Defence Department procurement agency), an open and transparent sole sourcing process where appropriate, and a heavier reliance on buying "off the shelf" equipment when suitable.||
The Government continues to make improvements to defence procurement policies and processes, and appreciates the Committee's acknowledgement of the successes to date. We can and will do more to simplify and shorten processes while maintaining appropriate safeguards and controls to ensure that Canadians obtain best value from defence spending, and that defence acquisitions are done with as much transparency as possible and subject to adequate checks and balances.
The Committee has correctly assessed that the concept proposed by some to fundamentally restructure the present relationship between DND and PWGSC and create a defence procurement agency is a very complex issue with significant risks on both sides of the argument.
Significant progress has been achieved in the last two years, through collaborative effort on the part of the departments and agencies involved, to reduce the timelines to procure military equipment. In the past, it has taken an average of nine years from the identification of need to contract award. The Government is well on its way to reducing the average time it takes to reach contract award to less than four years, and is committed to continuously improve the efficiency of military procurement.
As noted in the Government's response to Recommendation 2, we are fully committed to open and transparent processes for both competitive and non-competitive procurements.
The Government agrees with the recommendation to purchase mature "off the shelf" solutions wherever appropriate and continues to follow this approach whenever possible. (Full response available online)
|Through the institution of a series of procurement
reforms, the Department was able to deliver on requirements in a most expeditious
fashion. For example, timeframes for the acquisition of materiel were reduced
from 107 months to less than 48 months. This was achieved through implementation
of the following reforms:
|7. When large capital projects are awarded the Department of National Defence provide a clear public accounting of why certain contractors were chosen over others, with the obvious exception of classified and proprietary information.||
The Government already provides as much information as it can concerning the selection of contractors to meet both defence and non-defence requirements. The Committee will understand that the Government is significantly constrained in its ability to publicly release details of contractors' bids and the analysis of those bids by officials, as the bid documents and their contents are proprietary to the bidders. PWGSC manages the bidding process and is responsible to ensure that solicitation documents clearly describe the bid evaluation process and all selection criteria, including terms and conditions, Industrial Regional Benefits, operational requirements and technical requirements. Non-successful bidders are offered the opportunity to meet with PWGSC and DND representatives to review the evaluation of their bids and gain an understanding of how they were rated and why. They are also advised of the independent redress mechanisms available to them if they feel that the bid process was flawed or unfair. The Government views this system, which has been in place for many years, as providing the best combination of transparency of process and protection of bidders' proprietary information or third-party confidential information.
The Department of Public Works and Government Services Act was amended in May 2008 to create the position of Procurement Ombudsman to ensure greater fairness, openness and transparency in procurement. (Full response available online).
|8. The Department of National Defence and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade continue discussion with the US Department of State to put in place a system that can be considered just for all Canadian citizens and landed immigrants.||
The Government agrees with this recommendation and is pursuing discussions with the US to this end.
The United States' International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), administered by the State Department, regulates the export of militarily sensitive defence articles and services from the United States. For decades, Canada has enjoyed special status as the only country with specific exemptions under these regulations. However, as discussed in the Committee's Report, following the events of 9/11 ITAR provisions were applied more stringently to remaining licensable export authorizations, especially as regards restrictions on dual-nationality provisions. In practice, this has meant that Canadian citizens born or with nationality from one of about twenty-four proscribed countries were generally denied access to ITAR controlled goods or information. This dual-nationality restriction is inconsistent with the application of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
The priority of the Government of Canada is to continue discussion with the Department of State in order to find comparable long-term solutions for other federal government departments with similar requirements and Canadian industry. The Committee will understand that the issue is complex and will likely take some time to fully resolve to the satisfaction of the Government and Canadians. (Full response available online)
|Limited but measured progress has been made to date. Recent internal initiatives by the U.S. government have raised the possibility of a potential multi-lateral solution on ITAR that could address at least some aspects of Canada's concern. The Committee will understand that this issue is particularly complex and may take some time to fully resolve to the satisfaction of the Government and Canadians.|
|9. The Government continue to evaluate the new practice (single point of accountability contracting), taking into consideration the intention to sustain, promote, and enhance Canadian regional industries and their participation.||
The Government acknowledges the concerns raised regarding "single point accountability contracting" and appreciates the Committee's support for taking the time to properly gauge the potential impacts. We will continue to evaluate all of our procurement strategies to ensure that they remain relevant to current national and international conditions, and deliver the best outcomes for the country.
The "single point accountability" or "total solution" procurement strategy has been adopted in certain acquisitions to address both the reality of a global trend towards tighter control by rights owners over the transfer and use of their Intellectual Property, and a number of cases where the separation of equipment acquisition and in-service support contracts has created costly and difficult problems for the Department of National Defence. In some instances these have affected Canadian Forces operations.
The Government will continue to leverage long-term, high quality work opportunities for Canadian industry through industrial and regional benefits (IRBs). The IRBs associated with these in-service support contracts will provide opportunities for Canadian industry to participate on major defence procurements for at least the next twenty years. This will assist in ensuring the long-term viability of the Canadian industry's in-service support capability.
|1st Report of the Standing Committee on National
Defence, 39th Parliament, 1st Session, "Canadian Forces in Afghanistan"
(Adopted by the Committee on June 12, 2007; Presented to the House on June
Original report: http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=3034719&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=39&Ses=1
Government response: http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=39&Ses=1&DocId=3077584&File=0
|5. DND should review the need for some sort of flexible decompression programme for soldiers going home on midtour leave.||
DND currently runs an end of tour Third Location Decompression program to provide personnel with an opportunity to achieve a sense of closure to the mission and to prepare them for their return home. Building on pre-deployment briefings, this program increases awareness of operational stress injuries and provides information on what type of help is available. However, five years of research, literature reviews and experience in the area of deployment health indicate that there is no evidence in the scientific literature to suggest that a decompression program decreases the probability of developing, or increases the chance of recovering from, an operational stress injury. National Defence is continuing to evaluate the benefits of the end of tour Third Location Decompression program.
Equally, there is no evidence that a program to prepare soldiers for mid-tour leave would have any significant impact on their chances of developing, or recovering from, an operational stress injury. Moreover, instituting a mid-tour decompression program would create logistical and operational concerns. Currently, the CF aim to have personnel going on mid-tour leave spend a minimum of one day at an intermediate staging base located in Southwest Asia before starting their leave to allow soldiers a period of adjustment from the high operational tempo and stress in a secure environment. Health services and personnel support are available during this time if soldiers require assistance before their departure. As soldiers on a six month tour receive 18 days of mid-tour leave, the Government believes this short break offers soldiers accessible support if needed without unnecessarily reducing the time spent with their friends and families.
DND continues to conduct an end of tour Third Location Decompression (TLD) program to provide personnel with an opportunity to achieve a sense of closure to the mission and prepare them for their return home as an integral component of the re-integration process. While it remains that there is no evidence in the scientific literature to suggest that a decompression program decreases the probability of developing, or increases the chance of recovering from, an operational stress injury; there is sufficient evidence to suggest that TLD is well received by CF members and that the vast majority feel the program is warranted. Indeed, in surveys of 10,598 CF members that attended TLD thus far, 83% recommended the TLD for future rotations. In a follow up 4 - 6 months later on a subsample, 83% believed the TLD made reintegration easier for them, 71% felt it made them realize that there is nothing wrong with seeking help for a mental health problem, 67% felt it helped them readjust to a Canadian way of life and 67% felt it made reintegration easier for their family. As such, DND deems the program a valuable component of assisting CF members with re-integrating back to routine life, post deployment, and the Department continues to evaluate all elements of the program, and its merits on a recurring basis.
The commitment, with respect to mid tour leave, remains extant. The CF aim to have personnel going on mid-tour leave spend a minimum of one day at an intermediate staging base located in Southwest Asia before starting their leave. This allows soldiers a period of adjustment from the high operational tempo and stress in a secure environment. Health services and personnel support are available during this time if soldiers require assistance before their departure.
|6. The government should recognize the critical and growing work done by the Operational Stress Injury Social Support Network and support it with appropriate funding and other resources, so that it can keep up with the growing need of caring for returning Afghanistan Veterans and their families.||The Government recognizes the critical work being done by the Operational Stress Injury Social Support (OSISS) network.||Since the launch of the OSISS network in February 2002, National Defence funding for OSISS initiatives has increased every year. In 2006, the program launched a Bereavement component to support families who lost a loved one. In fiscal year 2007-2008 alone, the Government approved a 25% increase in Department's funding for OSISS. DND implemented a regional management structure to the program in March 2009 recognizing the importance of supporting front line staff and to create a more robust case management capacity within the program. A comprehensive strategy has now been developed leveraging the success of OSISS which will see the development of a Canadian Peer Based Mental Health Initiative which is fully supported by the CF Surgeon General's office and about to be formally approved by the Chief of Military personnel. This strategy includes the development of a comprehensive education/prevention initiative to mitigate Operational Stress Injuries as well as general Mental Health problems, decrease stigma, provide tangible tools for leaders to intervene at their levels and remove many of the existing barriers to mental health care.|
|12. The Minister of National Defence should appear at least four times a year before the Standing Committee on National Defence, to provide a televised situation report, outlining the status, activity and effect of all Canadian Forces operational missions being conducted at the time.||The Government recognizes and supports the principles of ministerial accountability and responsibility to Parliament, including responding to parliamentary committee questions on the Government's policies, programs and activities. The Minister of National Defence has always worked to accommodate committee requests for appearances and will continue to do so in the future. However, designating a specific number of appearances in advance would be arbitrary and, depending on the tempo of CF operations and developments in Afghanistan, may not be the most effective way to provide information to the Committee. The Government of Canada, including DND, is firmly committed to keeping the Standing Committee on National Defence properly informed of the status of the mission in Afghanistan.||At the request of the Standing Committee on National Defence, the Minister appeared on 9 February 2009 with senior departmental officials on the Supplementary Estimates (B). During this appearance he took a number of questions from Committee members on the Canadian mission in Afghanistan.|
|13. In months during which the Committee is not traveling and in which the Minister does not appear, a Canadian Forces senior officer should continue to appear before the Committee to present a briefing on the mission status, activity and effect of all ongoing Canadian Forces operational missions since the last report and provide a view of what can be expected in the next month.||During the last year, National Defence accommodated the committee's request to provide a senior officer to deliver bi-weekly and later monthly operational briefings to the committee. National Defence will continue to provide such briefings to the committee.||
At the request of the Standing Committee on National Defence, senior military officials provided operational briefings on the Canadian mission in Afghanistan to the Committee on the following occasions:
9 March 2009: Brigadier-General Champagne, Director-General Operations,
Strategic Joint Staff
|16. The Standing Committee on National Defence should visit the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan at least once annually, at an appropriate time, in order to review the status of the mission at that time and any progress being made.||Approval for travel must be sought from the House of Commons and the travel funds are part of a separate budget request. While the Government supports the idea of annual visits in principle, operational and security considerations may affect the timing of any visit. For example, increased operational tempo could limit the availability of personnel the committee might wish to meet, thereby making it difficult for the committee to achieve the strategic objectives of its visit at that particular time. Visits may also be affected by the availability of air transport and accommodation, and be subject to modification due to operational priorities. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade is the lead department for consideration of any VIP travel within a nation outside of Canada, including Afghanistan. The Department of National Defence works to implement travel requests to theatre as approved by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and must respect other restrictions as dictated by the Government of Afghanistan or NATO.||The Standing Committee on National Defence traveled to Afghanistan from 25-27 May 2008.|
|19. The government should increase the Canadian Forces contributions to Afghan National Army training so that, as the Afghan National Army grows and matures, higher level collective training of new kandaks can be conducted prior to real operations.||
The Government recognizes the importance of increasing its contribution to Afghan National Army training; the conditions are now right for Canada to redouble its training and mentoring initiatives and to focus that effort on achieving results in Kandahar Province to reinforce our security, development and reconstruction achievements. Since 2006, Canada has fielded a large Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) in support of the 1st Kandak of the 205th Brigade based in Kandahar Province. With newly formed Kandaks arriving in Kandahar Province in July 2007, Canada augmented its contributions to ANA training by increasing the number of OMLTs to six and assigning them responsibility for three infantry Kandaks, a Combat Support Kandak, a Combat Service Support Kandak, and a Brigade Headquarters. These new OMLTs will be instrumental in raising the operational effectiveness of the recently arrived ANA units to measurable proficiency standards such that they can first participate in International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) missions in support of Joint Task Force Afghanistan, and in time, lead security operations.
The Canadian effort is fully consistent with recent calls by NATO for increased contributions to ANA capacity building, in particular through the provision of Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams. NATO has expressed its satisfaction with Canada's increased efforts in this respect.
Decisions regarding future levels of Canadian contributions to ANA training will be determined by the ANA's progress and capacity, CF operational requirements and assistance being provided by allies. (Full response available online)
The Government recognizes the importance of increasing its contribution to Afghan National Army training; the conditions are now right for Canada to redouble its training and mentoring initiatives and to focus that effort on achieving results in Kandahar Province to reinforce our security, development and reconstruction achievements. Since 2006, Canada has fielded a large Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) in support of the 1st Kandak of the 205th Brigade based in Kandahar Province. With newly formed Kandaks arriving in Kandahar Province in July 2007, Canada augmented its contributions to ANA training by increasing the number of OMLTs to six and assigning them responsibility for three infantry Kandaks, a Combat Support Kandak, a Combat Service Support Kandak, and a Brigade Headquarters. These OMLTs are instrumental in raising the operational effectiveness of the ANA units to measurable proficiency standards such that they can participate in International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) missions in support of Joint Task Force Afghanistan, and lead security operations.
The Canadian effort is fully consistent with recent calls by NATO for increased contributions to ANA capacity building, in particular through the provision of Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams. NATO has expressed its satisfaction with Canada's increased efforts in this respect.
Decisions regarding future levels of Canadian contributions to ANA training will be determined by the ANA's progress and capacity, CF operational requirements and assistance being provided by allies. In that respect, we are planning to add an OMLT in 2010 which will be assigned to a fourth infantry Kandak that is being formed to operate in Kandahar Province.
|11th Report of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts,
39th Parliament, 1st Session, "Chapter 2, National Defence - Military Recruiting
and Retention" of the May 2006 Report of the Auditor General of Canada,
(Adopted by the Committee on November 30, 2006; Presented to the House on
December 7, 2006)
Original report: http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=2560007&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=39&Ses=1
Government response: http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=39&Ses=1&DocId=2830673&File=0
|2. That the Department of National Defence report progress in the implementation of its action plan to strengthen the recruitment and retention of military personnel in its annual Departmental Performance Report, beginning with the Report for the period ending 31 March 2007. The Department should also report progress in implementing its national recruiting attractions plan as well as its strategic guidance on national recruiting. In making this information available to Parliament, the Department must make clear reference to the outcomes that are being achieved.||The Department of National Defence will ensure that the information identified in this recommendation is included in its annual Departmental Performance Report beginning with the report for the period ending 31 March 2007.||The National Attractions Plan is embedded in the CF Recruiting Group's (CFRG) Annual Operations Plan, which has been published for the past three years. Recruiting targets for fiscal year 2007-08 were achieved and for fiscal year 2008-09 CFRG continued to improve on the enrolment targets for Priority Occupations. Also of note, the Strategic Guidance on National Recruiting was published in February 2007.|
|3. That the Department of National Defence establish a formal commitment to process applications for membership in the Canadian Armed Forces within thirty days, ensure that all applicants are made aware of that commitment and report its progress in meeting those goals in its annual Departmental Performance Report.||The Government will continue to explore additional opportunities to streamline applicant processing and is progressing with the development of a robust performance measurement system based on the Treasury Board framework for service standards. Progress in meeting the goals identified above will be included in the annual Departmental Performance Report for the Department of National Defence, beginning with the report for the period ending 31 March 2007.||Attainment of the goal for applicant processing of 30% completed in 5 days and 70% in 30 days continues to be a significant challenge. Improvements were made in applicant service, eliminating waiting time and in the prioritization of processing. While the Commanding Officers of Recruiting Centres have been given the authority to conduct parallel processing in order to maximize the use of their resources at any given time and ensure concurrent activity, delays due to difficulties in resolving issues discovered in processing such as medical fitness questions requiring specialist follow-up, further information from applicants or confirmation of pre-security screening status continue to impede significant improvement in average processing times.|
|8. The Department of National Defence determine the rate of attrition for female members of the Canadian Forces and, in its exit surveys, seek to establish which factors prompt female members to leave the Forces before full service is completed. The results, along with corrective measures taken to encourage women to complete their full service should be reported in the Department's annual Performance Reports, beginning with the Report for the period ending 31 March 2008.||A comprehensive survey analysis that will be conducted in the fall of 2007 will allow the Government to better understand the reasons female members of the Canadian Forces decide to leave the military. Should trends be identified that indicate a need for change, the Government will initiate appropriate corrective measures. The results of this survey analysis, together with any corrective measures undertaken, will be reported in the Departmental Performance Reports, beginning with the report for the period ending 31 March 2008.||
The CF Retention Strategy was approved by the Armed Forces Council in March 2009 and includes six lines of operations and 43 initiatives. The main lines of operations are Career/Employment Management, Career/Family Balance and Basic Training. Four of the initiatives have been implemented and the rest will be implemented over the next two years. The strategy is based on CF attrition research findings and is designed to address attrition issues and increase retention at two specific points. The first one is attrition occurring during the first year of service (YOS) and the second is attrition occurring at and after 20 YOS.
Female Attrition Rates for the CF Regular Force
The female attrition rates in fiscal year 2008-09 are lower then that for men. The male rates in 2008-09 were 6.9% for officers and 9.3% for Non-Commissioned Members (NCM). A study examining retention of women in navy occupations is being conducted.
|9. The Department of National Defence begin to report the results of the exit surveys it conducts among members of the Canadian Forces in its Departmental Performance Reports beginning with the Report for the period ending 31 March 2007. References to the methodology and scope of the surveys should be included.||The Department of National Defence will ensure that the information identified in this recommendation is included in its annual Departmental Performance Report. However, since the comprehensive analysis of survey results will not commence until the fall of 2007, the reporting of these results can only begin with the report for the period ending 31 March 2008.||The Exit Survey is given to all Regular Force members who are leaving the CF voluntarily. Survey completion is voluntary. Analysis of Exit Survey data from 2005 to 2008 has begun. The objective of the analysis is to assess departing members' satisfaction (agreement) with several organizational issues as well as determine the extent to which these organizational issues and dissatisfiers influence their decision to leave the CF. Final results will be formally reported next year by the newly stood up team within Defence dedicated to the Attrition and Retention research and analysis.|
|10. That the Department of National Defence establish a target for the maximum acceptable rate of attrition of its trained effective strength and monitor the performance of the package of measures it has instituted to meet that target. The Department should begin to report its progress in its annual Departmental Performance Report beginning with the report ending 31 March 2007.||The Government will include data regarding attrition rates in the Department of National Defence annual Departmental Performance Report beginning with the report ending 31 March 2007. However, the data will be based on trend analysis as opposed to pre-determined targets.||
During fiscal year 2008-2009, the CF set the Strategic Intake Plan at its highest level in many years and sought to recruit 7,995 personnel, up from 6,716 during 2007-08. Actual recruiting intake of 7,701 personnel resulted in an overall success rate of 96.3%. In order to help achieve the recruiting target for this fiscal year, the Department over-recruited for the infantry occupation by 44 percent. Once over-recruiting of the infantry occupation is factored out, the recruiting success rate was 88% of the established target.
Projected attrition for the year was 6,250 personnel; however, actual attrition was 6,217 personnel, for a 12-month average attrition of 9.1%. A decline in attrition was observed in the 3rd and 4th quarters of fiscal year 2008-09, with voluntary attrition in particular showing a downward inflection over the last 6 months of the fiscal year. Although it is too early to make a causal linkage this downturn coincided with the economic downturn.
As a result of continuing success in recruiting and lower than forecast attrition, force growth this past year was approximately 1,494 personnel - more than double the growth in the previous year, which was 628 personnel. Regular Force strength at fiscal year-end was 65,897 personnel and the CF is on track to meet the 2011-12 growth target of 68,000. Successes during the past fiscal year are the result of Canadian Forces Recruiting Group (CFRG) and the Environments to increase recruiting numbers and the Canadian Forces Leadership Recruit School (CFLRS) Retention Strategy that is starting to result in a reduction in Basic Military Qualification (BMQ) attrition. Should the external labour market experience continued and protracted deterioration, reduced attrition may be seen.
|15th Report of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts,
39th Parliament, 1st Session, "Chapter 5, Relocating Members of the Canadian
Forces, RCMP, and Federal Public Service" of the November 2006 Report of
the Auditor General of Canada (Adopted by the Committee on May 16, 2007;
Presented to the House on May 29, 2007)
Original report: http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=2955368&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=39&Ses=1
Government response: http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=39&Ses=1&DocId=3077631&File=0
|5. That the Department of National Defence, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and Treasury Board Secretariat include, in their annual Departmental Performance Reports, references to the Integrated Relocation-Program as it relates to their employees. Information on the numbers of employees using the Program, the costs, and the extent to which the purposes of the Program are being achieved must be included. This performance information must be included in DPRs beginning with Reports for the period ending 31 March 2008.||The Government accepts this recommendation.||
The purpose of the Integrated Relocation Program (IRP) is to relocate CF personnel and their families in the most efficient fashion and at the most reasonable cost to the public while having a minimum detrimental effect on the employee and family, and on departmental operations.
During fiscal year 2008-09, the CF authorized the service provider, Royal Lepage Relocation Services (RLRS), to effect relocations for 15,500 personnel. Records indicate that the administration fees paid to RLRS for providing relocation services totalled just under $26.5 million, including GST. The summation of the flow through costs for reimbursements made to CF personnel for relocation benefits were slightly greater than $240 million.
The CF IRP policy manual that was completely re-written in fiscal year 2007-08 for the policy year 2008-09 was very successful. Further adjustments were made to the IRP provisions for FY 2009-10 with the goal of making the program more flexible and providing increased options to members. Surveys administered regarding the level of satisfaction CF members have with the program indicated that the majority of the people are satisfied with the program. Work is nearly complete on the preparation of the Request for Proposal to re-tender the relocation contract through PWGSC for effect 1 December 2009.
Office of the Auditor General (OAG)
During the reporting period, the Auditor General tabled one Chapter in Parliament that included recommendations directed at the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces - "Support for Overseas Deployments" tabled in May 2008. In March 2009, the Auditor General tabled "National Security: Intelligence and Information Sharing" which involved the Department and the CF. However, DND was not the lead department for this Chapter, and none of the audit recommendations required a response from DND.
Also during the reporting period in response to the annual request by the OAG, National Defence provided updates on the status of all OAG audit recommendations tabled in Parliament during the five-year period 2002-03 to 2006-07.
In the Chapter entitled "Support for Overseas Deployments", the Auditor General concluded that despite shortcomings in the supply chain, no reports of supply problems that significantly affected operations were identified. However, this was found to be largely due to the high level of dedication and hard work of CF personnel. The Auditor General also concluded that unless certain supply chain deficiencies are addressed, the Department's ability to provide timely and appropriate support could be at risk over time.
The Chapter entitled "National Security: Intelligence and Information Sharing" was a follow up to a November 2003 Audit Observation and the March 2004 Chapter on "National Security". The Auditor General examined the progress made by 14 departments and agencies, including the DND/CF and Communications Security Establishment Canada, that are involved in the management and sharing of intelligence information. For just over half of the original recommendations, progress was listed as satisfactory.
These two Chapters, including departmental responses to the Auditor General's recommendations, can be accessed on the Auditor General's website at the following link: http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_lpf_e_1193.html.
No non-OAG external audits specific to the DND/CF were reported on during 2008-09.
Note: These refer to other external audits conducted by the Public Service Commission of Canada or the Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages.