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ARCHIVED - Government Response to the Tenth Report of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts

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Recommendation 1

That deputy ministers be designated as accounting officers with responsibilities similar to those held by accounting officers in the United Kingdom.  Features of this arrangement must include, but not limited to, the following:  

  • The personal duty of signing the financial accounts described in his or her letter of appointment.
  • The personal responsibility for the overall organization, management and staffing of the department and for department-wide procedures in financial or other matters.
  • Ensuring that there is a high standard of financial management in the department as a whole.
  • Personal responsibility for all powers and authorities either delegated or directly held.
  • Ensuring that financial systems and procedures promote the efficient and economical conduct of business and safeguard financial propriety and regularity throughout the department.
  • Ensuring that the department complies with parliamentary requirements in the control of expenditure with particular attention ensuring that funds are spent only to the extent and purposes authorized by Parliament.
  • As accounting officers, the personal responsibility of deputy ministers for negligence and wrongdoing does not diminish over time.

Recommendation 2

That as accounting officers, deputy ministers be held to account for the performance of their duties and for their exercise of statutory authorities before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Accounts; and

Recommendation 3

That the following procedures be adhered to when deputy ministers (as accounting officers) are in disagreement with their ministers regarding administration and operation of their departments:

  • The deputy minister must inform the minister if he or she has objections to a course of action proposed by the minister.
  • If the minister still wished to proceed, the deputy minister must set out his or her objections to the course of action in a letter to the minister stating the reasons for the objections and the deputy minister's duty to notify both the Auditor General of Canada and the Comptroller General of Canada.
  • If the minister still wished to proceed, he or she must instruct the deputy minister in writing to do so.
  • If instructions to proceed are received in writing, the deputy minister must send copies of the relevant correspondence to both the Auditor General of Canada and Comptroller General of Canada.

Recommendation 4

That the government endeavour to retain deputy ministers in their positions for periods of at least three years; however, their responsibilities are in no way diminished should their tenure be less then the recommended three years.

The government welcomes the Committee's contribution to the discussion of strengthening public sector accountability and appreciates the Committee's effort and detail in its analysis of ministerial and deputy ministerial accountability in Canadian government.   

In responding to the Committee's report, the government has chosen not to provide detailed responses to each of the Committee's specific recommendations.  Taking into account other related activities currently underway, including the Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities, led by Mr. Justice John Gomery, and the preparation of a review of the responsibilities and accountabilities of ministers and senior officials, the government is giving active consideration to a number of measures to strengthen accountability in order to improve public sector management that will be elaborated upon in the coming months.  Nevertheless, the government would like to take this opportunity to provide some general observations about the accounting officer concept and current Canadian practice.

It is the government's position that the Committee's report contains a number of apparent misconceptions about the existing ministerial and deputy ministerial accountability system.  The report conveys the general impression that there is ambiguity in the current system; however, there is no ambiguity with regard to the assignment of accountability – ministers are responsible for and accountable to Parliament for the overall management and direction of their departments, whether pertaining to policy or administration and whether actions are taken by ministers personally or by unelected officials under ministers' authority or under authorities vested in them directly. 

Nor is there ambiguity in the accountabilities of deputy ministers.  Deputy ministers are accountable to their ministers (and ultimately, through the Clerk of the Privy Council, to the Prime Minister) for the discharge of their responsibilities, as outlined in legislation or in management policies approved by the Treasury Board.  Even when senior officials support the accountability of ministers by providing information publicly, such as when appearing before parliamentary committees, they do so on behalf of their ministers.  These officials are answerable to Parliament in that they have a duty to inform and explain.  They do not have direct accountability to Parliament and may neither commit to a course of action (which would require a decision from ministers) nor be subjected to the personal consequences that parliamentarians may mete out.

The government also notes a number of specific points in the Committee's report with which there is disagreement.  For example the report states, "Once a minister has departed from a portfolio, no one can be held accountable by Parliament for what was done during that minister's tenure" (page 6, paragraph 2).   In fact, the current minister is accountable for taking corrective action, as appropriate, as well as for answering questions.  Holding a former minister accountable to Parliament would not make sense because that person no longer has any authority to take corrective action.  The logic of this is all the more apparent when the former minister is no longer in government, for example following a change in government after a general election.  Further, if a former minister is accused of unlawful conduct, as opposed to mismanagement, he or she is subject to the same processes of the justice system as anyone else.

The report states "ministers are answerable, but not fully accountable to Parliament for what is done by non-departmental agencies and other arm's length organization with the powers assigned to them by statute" (page 6, paragraph 4).  It is true that ministers are not accountable, but rather answerable, for matters that are explicitly removed from their purview.  Thus, for example, ministers are not accountable for the decisions of tribunals or the day-to-day management of agencies and Crown corporations.  However, ministers are accountable for arm's length entities in their portfolio at a systemic level - for example, to ensure that the right individuals are appointed, that the right framework legislation and corporate plan are in place, that the organization has received broad policy direction consistent with its mandate, and that the organization delivers on its mandate. 

Further, the report states that "Ministers are accountable for the actions of officials if these actions are broadly reflective of ministerial direction, and they are accountable for actions taken or not taken in relation to prevent (sic) errors or wrongdoing that could reasonably have been anticipated, but they are not directly accountable for the errors or wrongdoing of officials themselves" (page 7, paragraph 2).  This inappropriately equates accountability with blame – ministers are accountable for all actions of their officials in that they must explain and take action to correct as appropriate, but ministers are subject to personal consequences only where the matter can be attributed to their own inappropriate action or failure to act.

Finally the report describes as a "major weakness" the fact that deputy ministers are not accountable for their statutory authorities "to the ultimate sources of those authorities … the Parliament of Canada" (page 15, paragraph 2).  However, Parliament creates many statutory obligations – under the Income Tax Act, for example – but this does not give Parliament authority to oversee compliance or enforce the law.  That is a function of the executive.

The government also has some general observations about the accounting officer model and the current deputy ministerial system in Canada.  The government notes that the responsibilities of accounting officers are very similar to those of a deputy minister under the Financial Administration Act and Treasury Board policies.  Similar to accounting officers, deputy ministers are responsible for financial regularity and probity; economy, efficiency and effectiveness; financial and management systems for departmental programs and public property.  Further, deputy ministers regularly appear before parliamentary committees to provide information and explanations concerning the administration of the department and programs under their authority.

Without further clarification, the government has concerns regarding the Committee's recommendation that deputy ministers be held to account "before" the Committee.  The government notes the distinction made by the Committee between accountability before Parliament and accountability to Parliament.  If accountability before Parliament means the rendering of a factual account of what was done and answering questions to provide information and explanations before a parliamentary committee, it is difficult to see how that would differ from the existing system, whereby deputy ministers are answerable to parliamentary committees. 

The government also has concerns regarding the 'special procedure' of documenting and reporting an overruling by the minister, particularly if it were required in the context of any "disagreement with their ministers regarding administration and operation of their departments".  There is nothing currently to stop a deputy minister from requesting written instructions from his or her minister.  However, systematically formalizing and potentially making public any disagreement on administrative or operational matters runs the risk of significantly undermining the working relationship between ministers and deputy ministers that is essential to the effective operation of government departments. 

The appointment of deputy ministers is based on the operational and policy needs of the government.  The length of a deputy minister's term in a position in no way diminishes his or her accountability and responsibility.  Deputy ministers typically have significant depth and breath of experience and expertise, and they remain accountable for the performance of their departments regardless of the duration of their assignment.  However, the government does make best efforts for deputy ministers to remain in position for a number of years to ensure stability and continuity for the organization.  A review of deputy ministerial assignments over the last ten years indicates that deputy ministers have served on average almost 3.5 years per assignment during that time.

Putting aside specific consideration of the accounting officer model, a core issue in the Canadian context is the need to clarify the expectations of ministers and deputy ministers in exercising their management responsibilities and accountabilities.  The concerns about clarifying who is responsible for what, which in part have given rise to the suggested introduction of the accounting officer model as a solution, are being directly addressed by two specific government initiatives that will clarify expectations, the assessment of performance and the meting of consequences.  These are: i) the consolidation and streamlining of the suite of Treasury Board management policies; and ii) the continuing development and implementation of the Management Accountability Framework.

To hold individuals accountable for their performance in fulfilling delegated responsibilities, it must be clear, through the Treasury Board's management policies, who is charged with doing what.  The government is streamlining the Treasury Board suite of management policies – both by reducing the number of policies and by simplifying the content of each policy – in order to focus the management policy suite more narrowly on the core principles of sound public management.  The renewal of Treasury Board policies is ongoing and will reinforce the essential control and management systems deputy ministers must have in place in their departments. 

The Management Accountability Framework (MAF) was developed in 2003 to set out the management expectations of deputy ministers with respect to ten broad elements of management.  The MAF is currently being used in three related ways.  First, it clarifies the expectations for management that pertain to deputy ministers and the standards that should guide departmental practices.  Second, the Treasury Board Secretariat is using the MAF as a key tool in the monitoring and oversight of departments by doing assessments of management performance and using these as the basis of discussion between the Secretary of the Treasury Board and deputy ministers of departments in order to establish management improvement priorities.  Third, the MAF is also being used in determining the consequences of management performance, as the assessment of departmental performance against the MAF, among other things, is considered by the Clerk of the Privy Council, in consultation with the Committee of Senior Officials, in making recommendations on the performance ratings of deputy ministers to the Prime Minister.  Finally, in the future, the MAF will be the basis for reporting on whole-of-government management performance.

In conclusion, these two initiatives, unto themselves, will go a long way to strengthen accountability in a manner consistent with the overall approach to improving public sector management initiated by the government and within Canadian traditions and realities.