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6.1 Identifying the Issues

The Committee's findings, as reported in Chapter V, have revealed many problems with the public service labour-management relationship and collective bargaining system. In many cases, labour and management agree on those problems. In others, only one side sees the problem. In still others, both sides see a problem but for different reasons.

The issues discussed below are those we see as key. It is important to recognize that the issues are not mutually exclusive, that is, there may well be some overlap between particular issues. Nonetheless, the following discussion should at least be a useful starting point for further analysis.

6.2 The Government's Dual Role

The concern most frequently cited—by both sides—is the degree of power the government possesses in its dual role as employer and legislator. This power, which is more than any private sector employer possesses, has been used on many occasions and has taken such varied forms as the suspension of bargaining and arbitration, pay freezes, and the passing of back-to-work legislation.

It is this imbalance of power which seems to be the root cause of much of the feeling of powerlessness and frustration described in Chapter V. A related finding is that frequent legislative intervention has eroded confidence in the system and trust between the parties. Another, equally serious consequence is that the players in the public service labour-management system can become so used to government intervention that they lose the ability to work out problems for themselves.⁶⁰ The imbalance of power also politicizes the system and has led some bargaining agents to attempt various types of direct political action.

Frequent legislative intervention does have the positive consequence that politicians must take direct responsibility for the intervention themselves instead of handing it over to a labour relations board or some other form of administrative tribunal. But in our view, this potential benefit must be weighed against the many negative consequences of government intervention.

6.3 Restrictive Legislative Framework

This imbalance of power also seems to be reflected in the legislative framework within which federal public service collective bargaining is carried out. This framework, particularly in the PSSRA, is significantly more restrictive than that under which private sector bargaining is carried out, and more restrictive even than that found in most other public sector regimes.⁶¹ The restrictive legislative framework was criticized both by management and union representatives, though more often by the latter.

6.3.1 Scope of Bargaining

One serious limitation in the current legislative framework is the restriction it places on the scope of bargainable and arbitrable issues. As was noted in Chapter II, the PSSRA does not allow bargaining over any issue, except for the appropriation of funds, that would require parliamentary legislation. Among the issues that cannot be bargained are: the criteria for appointments, promotions, lay-offs, job classifications, pensions, and technological and organizational change.

The PSSRA's restrictions on the scope of bargaining affect public service labour-management relations in a number of ways. First, they hinder the bargaining process because many of the issues of concern to employees can never be "put on the table" for discussion and resolution. Second, the restrictions themselves can become a source of increased conflict, causing the parties to waste time and energy arguing about what can and cannot be bargained rather than engaging in productive negotiations. The restrictions also reduce the ability of the bargaining system to work out problems between the parties, thereby pushing the "restricted" issues into other forums and contributing to the bargaining system's politicization.

6.3.2 Determination of Bargaining Units

Another important limitation of the public service bargaining system is the way in which bargaining units are determined. In the private sector, bargaining units normally are determined by labour-relations boards, generally with considerable input from the parties. In determining the appropriate bargaining unit, labour boards put primary emphasis on creating a "community of interest" likely to result in reasonably harmonious relations between the parties.⁶²

In contrast, under the PSSRA, as under most Canadian public service bargaining regimes, bargaining units are determined legislatively. The legislative determination of bargaining units often prevents an appropriate "community of interest" from emerging and may well make bargaining more difficult. The complexity of the federal public service bargaining unit structure was a concern raised by a number of management representatives.

6.3.3 Redress Mechanisms

The question of which issues may be taken to arbitration or adjudication under public service labour legislation was of concern to both management and union representatives.

In some cases, an aggrieved employee has a number of different avenues of redress. Those whose grievances deal with disciplinary matters may go to their union or, alternatively, may carry the matter forward without reference to the union. On the other hand, for some issues such as performance appraisals there is no meaningful third-party redress mechanism. A federal government employee cannot grieve a negative performance appraisal through to adjudication because the issue of performance appraisals is not contained in federal government collective agreements. The reason performance appraisals are not contained in collective agreements is that the issue of performance is one of those items prohibited from being arbitrated pursuant to Section 69 of the PSSRA.

The absence of meaningful and straightforward avenues of redress for some issues heightens frustration among employees and their unions. At the same time, the existence of multiple avenues of redress for other issues slows down the process of dispute resolution, tends to render the system unduly complex and difficult to understand, and leads to costs for the employer and the unions.

The PSSRA's ban on policy grievances is also of concern. Under the Act, only an individual worker may file a grievance and take it through to adjudication. The ban on anything other than individual grievances prevents issues of more general applicability from being heard in an appropriate and timely fashion. It can also lead to "system overload" in cases where a large number of employees decide to file grievances on the same issue at the same time.

6.3.4. Managerial Exclusions

One final restriction is that of exclusions. This issue was of concern to both sides, but for different reasons. To the unions, the issue is one of fairness. In their view, the exclusion process results in too many employees being excluded from bargaining units. This in turn means that the individuals in question go unrepresented and the unions lose potential members and dues. For management, exclusions are a process issue. Their view is that the process is unnecessarily long and cumbersome, and should therefore be simplified.

6.4 Dispute Resolution Mechanisms

Shortly after it came into effect, the industrial-relations community praised as innovative the choice of procedures (COP) mechanism allowing the bargaining agent to choose between arbitration and the traditional conciliation-strike route. COP, which was copied in a number of Canadian and U.S. jurisdictions during the 1970s,⁶³ drew praise from union and management respondents in written submissions to the Committee.

Throughout the 1990s, however, neither COP nor any other form of dispute resolution mechanism was allowed to operate, as the government suspended first collective bargaining, then interest arbitration. Our findings show that the lack of an effective dispute resolution mechanism is of concern to both management and union representatives, though it appears to be a more serious concern to the latter.

6.5 Essential Services & Designation

Both sides cited as a concern the issue of providing essential services during public service strikes through the designation of certain workers or positions, but they did so for different reasons.

As was noted in Chapter V, the unions believe that too many workers are designated and that they have little say in the designation process. The unions' frustration over the designation process has been heightened by the government's recent suspension of interest arbitration. That has left bargaining units that have high designation levels—who would therefore find it difficult to mount an effective strike—subject to unilateral government determination of the terms and conditions of their employment. For their part, government managers believe that the designation process is cumbersome and takes too long.

The findings discussed in Chapter V suggest that this issue is a source of increased friction between the parties and will likely continue to be a significant irritant.⁶⁴

6.6 Lack of an Independent Pay Research Bureau

As was noted in Chapter IV, both sides spoke favourably of the role played by the former Pay Research Bureau (PRB) as an independent and neutral source of economic data to be used in collective bargaining. The lack of a PRB or some similar, politically neutral mechanism has served to make salary bargaining more difficult. All parties appear to believe that restoring the PRB could improve the public service bargaining process and facilitate new alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, most of which require a mutually acceptable fact base as a starting point.

6.7 Problems of the Separate Agencies

Bargaining agents and the agencies themselves both raised concerns about special conditions governing labour-management relations in the separate agencies. Bargaining agents were critical of the Treasury Board for not providing the agencies with a sufficiently broad negotiating mandate to allow collective bargaining to meet the agencies' special needs. Another concern is that under the PSSRA,⁶⁵ employees of separate agencies have fewer grounds for referring grievances to adjudication than do employees of departments. The agencies themselves were concerned about the degree of control exercised by the Treasury Board and the lack of flexibility for separate employers to determine their own negotiating mandates.

Pay equity has been a particular problem for the separate agencies, which are not covered by the agreements reached between the employer and the PSAC or the PIPSC. One agency complained that since the pay equity agreement increased the salaries of clerks and secretaries in the federal government, it has found it difficult to recruit and retain such workers in the Ottawa area.

6.8 Lack of Trust

In submissions to the Committee, both sides referred to a lack of trust between the parties. This lack of trust seems to have resulted in large measure from the restrictiveness of the current legislative regime and the federal government's frequent interventions in that regime. The lack of trust has made it harder for the parties to work out problems in the workplace and at the bargaining table. It has also contributed to the politicization of the system.

One reason for the lack of trust may be a lack of labour relations training among executives and managers, and a general lack of understanding of the difference between a labour-management relations approach and a human-resource-management approach to dealing with workplace problems. Our findings suggest that this failure to understand the distinction between the two approaches has sometimes led the government to marginalize the unions or to bypass them, dealing instead with employees individually, even on matters covered by collective agreements.

6.9 Conclusion

This report has pointed out some of the most significant manifestations of a power imbalance between the government and the unions representing its employees. We invite feedback from readers as input to our second report, where we will propose solutions for the problems outlined here, and for the issues identified in our deliberations. It is our view that unless these problems are addressed, the federal public service labour-management-relations system as currently constituted will likely not be sustainable in the twenty-first century.

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Appendix 1: Details of Key Findings

The purpose of this appendix is to offer a more detailed look at the findings summarized in Chapter V. In this appendix, we discuss the results of our department, agency, and bargaining agent questionnaires. We also consider the results of 12 template interviews of individuals with significant federal public service collective bargaining experience.

Department Questionnaires

Of 30 department heads to whom questionnaires were sent, 23 responded, for a response rate of 77% (see Diagram 1). Overall, it would appear that the departments' experience with collective bargaining has been fairly positive—certainly much more so than that of the bargaining agents. But it should also be noted that the experience has been more negative over the past decade and that a number of problems continue to exist.

Asked for an overall evaluation of how well public service collective bargaining has worked, ten department heads were generally positive and four were generally negative, while seven had a mixed response or were not sure, and two noted that no collective bargaining as such was conducted in their departments. But eleven of the department heads, including six of those whose view was positive overall, said that the experience had worsened in recent years, owing to suspension of bargaining, government-imposed wage freezes, several major strikes, and back-to-work legislation. "Unilateral government action has eroded confidence in the system," replied one deputy minister, whose view appeared to reflect those of many of his colleagues on this point.

Asked to use a single word or phrase to describe public service labour relations during the period of their departments' involvement, most department heads were again relatively positive. Thirteen chose a positive word or phrase compared to only four who chose a negative one (see Diagram 2). The response of two department heads was mixed, and two felt they could not summarize the collective bargaining experience in a single word. Two department heads did not answer the question. Those who felt positive about the bargaining experience described it as "generally good," "excellent," "professional," "open and frank," or characterized by a "partnership approach." Those whose experiences had been more negative described the bargaining experience as "challenging," "frustrating," or "tense and reactive."

Asked what had worked best about the collective bargaining system, three praised the PSSRA's dispute resolution provisions, while two spoke highly of the workforce adjustment process under Program Review. Also drawing praise were the work of the Pay Research Bureau and the continuing cooperation between the parties at the National Joint Council (NJC).

Overall, department heads had more to say about the negative than about the positive aspects of the collective bargaining system. The suspension of bargaining, pay equity, salary freezes and financial restraints and the government's repeated use of back-to-work legislation were all problems cited by three or more department heads. Three department heads also complained about the number of issues brought to the bargaining table, one suggesting that the number be limited statutorily to ten. Three also complained about the existence of too many different bargaining agents and Treasury Board's failure to give government negotiators a broad enough mandate to allow them to do their job effectively.

Other identified problems included the length of the bargaining process and the suspension of arbitration rights. One deputy minister complained that there was not enough focus on departments' particular needs. A related criticism was that it is difficult to convince managers that they have a say in the bargaining process "because they think everything is predetermined."

Of department heads who responded directly to the question about continuing problems, fourteen said that the problems they had identified still exist; four said that some of the problems still exist (see Diagram 3).

When asked for additional comments, respondents made a number of calls for the introduction of alternative-dispute-resolution and interest-based-bargaining systems. Several seemed concerned by the rigidity of the current bargaining system. One deputy minister complained of the existence of too many avenues for recourse for employees with problems, while another insisted that issues such as staffing, classification, and pensions should remain non-negotiable.

Agency Questionnaires

In all, 13 of 25 separate agencies responded to the questionnaire, for a response rate of 52% (see Diagram 4). Two of the agencies responding do not engage in collective bargaining and so could not provide substantive responses.

In general, agency responses were fairly similar to those of departments, in that more characterized their overall bargaining experience as positive than negative. It should be noted, however, that lack of an adequate negotiating mandate and conflict with Treasury Board are problems which appear to be more severe for separate agencies than for departments.

Of the eleven agencies with significant bargaining experience to report, six were generally positive and two were generally negative, while two others were mixed. It was not possible to determine the eleventh agency's feelings about the experience from its response. Three of the six generally positive respondents noted a recent deterioration, one attributing it specifically to the Treasury Board's process for separate employers.

Ten of the agencies that engage in collective bargaining provided a word or phrase summarizing their collective bargaining experience. The four positive respondents used such words as "realistic and reasonable," "highly collaborative," and "challenging yet reasonably positive." The five negative ones spoke of the process as "negative," "restrictive," "difficult," and "frustrating" (see Diagram 5 ). The tenth agency's response might best be characterized as mixed.

Asked what they liked best about public service collective bargaining, one agency head said "everything," another praised the positive and constructive relationship with the union, and a third cited the "open and honest exchange of views at the table." Mediation, conciliation, and the role of the NJC and PSSRB also drew favourable comment, as did "the research and legwork undertaken by Treasury Board."

Like the departments, the agencies made more negative than positive comments overall. The most serious problem, identified by six of the eleven agencies responding to this question, was the relationship between agencies and Treasury Board. Here, one agency summed things up by suggesting that agencies' collective bargaining "raises the issue of establishment. Are separate employers truly independent in the collective bargaining process or is Treasury Board control so great that they are really part of the TB establishment?"

Five other agencies complained, to varying degrees and in different ways, about the lack of room for manoeuvre given separate agencies in negotiation. The most critical of them described the relationship with TB as adversarial—often more so than its relationship with the union.

Four agencies were critical of government intervention in the bargaining system through such actions as suspension of bargaining and arbitration, salary freezes, and the issuing of back-to-work legislation. On other issues, three agencies complained about various aspects of pay equity and about what they see as an overly complex bargaining unit and classification system. Other issues that drew negative comments included the length of the bargaining process, the introduction of alternative modes of service delivery, the effects of government reorganization and program review, the PSSRA's excessive complexity, and the miscommunication of information by unions to employees during the bargaining process.

When asked whether the problems identified in the previous question still applied, eight agency heads said they did, one said that for the most part the problems have been solved, and another was not sure (see Diagram 6). The eleventh agency did not respond to this question. Additional comments again pointed to the difficult relationship between agencies and Treasury Board, one agency head noting that "Separate employers are faced with double the obstacles when it comes to collective bargaining," since they must negotiate with both Treasury Board and the bargaining agent. Another noted that the recent pay equity settlement did not extend to separate employers, with the result that agency employees doing the same work as department employees are receiving "unfair and inconsistent treatment." Yet another suggested the creation of an employers' council to address the issue of how strategic collective bargaining objectives should be established in the future for all public service organizations.

Questionnaires from Bargaining Agents

Of 17 bargaining agents, 12 (71%) responded to the questionnaire (see Diagram 7). In general, the bargaining agents' responses were far more negative than those from departments or separate agencies. Few thought that the bargaining process has worked at all well, while none provided a positive word or phrase to describe the experience. A criticism common to most of the bargaining agents was that unilateral government intervention in the collective bargaining system had led to cynicism, frustration, and a loss of morale and trust.

None of the ten bargaining agents responding to the question was willing to characterize the overall bargaining experience as positive⁶⁶. The Federal Government Dockyards Trades and Labour Council of Esquimalt characterized the process as "collective begging," while the Aircraft Operations Group Association spoke of a "continual fight to be recognized for our worth." The Social Science Employees Association (SSEA) said the system has worked poorly, and IBEW Local 2228 said it has not worked at all in the past ten years. For its part, the PIPSC allowed as how the benefits of a collective bargaining relationship have materialized—on the few occasions when bargaining rights have been allowed to apply.

Asked to describe their experience with public service labour-management relations in a single word or phrase, nine bargaining agents were totally negative while one response was mixed (see Diagram 8). The most positive response was that of the Canadian Merchant Service Guild, which said that labour-management relations had been good with respect to consultation and the grievance process, but totally inadequate with respect to collective bargaining. Other bargaining agents were much more negative, four describing themselves as "frustrated" and one saying it felt "victimized and discriminated against" by the Treasury Board. The Federal Government Dockyard Chargehands Association noted that while many words and phrases come to mind, none are printable.

Asked to say what had worked best about public service collective bargaining, four of the bargaining agents responding to the question either did not answer or had nothing positive to say about the process. PSAC said it had been able to negotiate a Master Agreement to the benefit of all when left to its own devices, but otherwise did not identify any specific positive aspect of the process. Likewise, the PIPSC said it had found no specific features of the process that stood out as having worked best, though it cited the negotiation of complex family benefit and career development issues as a positive achievement of collective bargaining.

Arbitration was the aspect of the collective bargaining system that drew the most praise, being cited by four of the eleven respondents.⁶⁷ The work of the NJC was cited by two, the PAFSO praising its approach as being "one of 'problem solving,' and less adversarial than collective bargaining."

In general, the bargaining agents had far more to say about the problems they had had with collective bargaining than about its benefits. The government came in for harsh criticism for its tendency toward unilateral legislative action, in the form of suspension of bargaining and arbitration rights, salary freezes, and back-to-work legislation. The PSAC appeared to speak for most of the unions when it said: "Collective bargaining must always be conducted in an atmosphere where the threat of having your rights removed is a constant consideration." The designation process, removal of the Pay Research Bureau, and the inability to negotiate such issues as classification, staffing, and pensions also drew sharp criticism from the bargaining agents.

Other unions complained about a "lack of meaningful dialogue at the table" and a lack of communication with senior decision makers in Treasury Board. The Canadian Association of Professional Radio Operators was upset by the government's "theft" of the public service pension surplus, inequitable compensation for certain groups, and an apparent lack of concern for groups in which all members are designated.

Asked whether the problems identified above continue to exist, all eleven bargaining agents responding to the question said 'yes,' although two of them noted that there have recently been a few encouraging signs coming from the Treasury Board. The PIPSC suggested that the problems may be becoming more severe as the government creates more separate employers, prepares to introduce UCS, and suspends arbitration until 2001. The PIPSC concludes that "These problems are mostly systemic, and will continue to exist until there are statutory changes."

Additional comments included a suggestion from the Canadian Merchant Service Guild that current public service legislation be scrapped and replaced with something like the Canada Labour Code. Two unions, including the Merchant Service Guild, suggested that the National Joint Council be given a larger role in the public service collective bargaining process. The PIPSC referred to the additional problems faced by separate employers, and the Dockyard Chargehands Association said that if the federal government expects to be seen as an employer of choice, it should start acting like one, and not pass legislation in response to difficult situations.

Template Interview Results

The Committee also conducted 12 template interviews with individuals with substantial experience in public service collective bargaining (see Appendix 6). Those interviewed included five whose current or most recent positions had been as management representatives, two whose most recent positions had been as union representatives,⁶⁸ and five whose current or most recent experience was as third-party neutrals.

Those "present at the creation" generally see public service bargaining as having worked fairly well for its first 10 or 12 years, deteriorating from the late 1970s onward as the result of wage controls and other government interventions in the process. Those still involved or whose heaviest involvement was in the 1990s suggest that the system has worked poorly or not at all, one saying that in his experience perhaps 5% of the issues were resolved through collective bargaining.

When interviewees were asked to sum up their experience with public service bargaining in a word or phrase, the responses were mixed. A former government manager described the process as "businesslike," while a former union official described it as "constructive—until disillusionment set in." Those who were more negative referred to the process as 'difficult,' "strained," "conflictual," or lacking in trust.

Asked what had worked best about public service bargaining, four cited the bargaining experience itself and the mutual respect shown on both sides, at least most of the time. The same number cited the work done by the National Joint Council on service-wide issues. Another said that things other than salaries and allowances have worked best, particularly "whatever has transpired outside the open, visible, collective bargaining milieu—outside the public eye."

Like the questionnaire respondents, those interviewed had many more negative than positive things to say about public service bargaining. Unilateral government actions such as the suspension of bargaining, pay freezes, and back-to-work legislation were a serious problem for seven of the twelve interviewees. Three cited the narrow scope of arbitrable issues, the dissolution of the Pay Research Bureau, and the structure of the union side (especially the PSAC). There was also significant concern about the PSAC's decision-making process.

Other concerns included the designation process, the narrow scope of bargainable issues, the general imbalance of power between the parties, the structure of the Treasury Board as an employer, and the lack of meaningful union-management interaction at the workplace level. One management interviewee suggested that the areas of management authority are often unclear. Sometimes, he said, it is not clear whether a problem such as harassment should be resolved by the department, by the government as a whole, by the Public Service Staff Relations Board, or by an external body such as the Canadian Human Rights Commission.

Asked whether the problems continued to exist, eleven of the twelve interviewees said they did, while the twelfth said that some of the problems had been solved. One management representative said that the problems seemed to be getting worse, while another said, "They wouldn't have asked you to do this review if the problems weren't still here."

The additional comments revealed a broad range of concerns and some interesting suggestions for how to go about addressing them. One management representative said he is not convinced that there is any future in bargaining public service salaries, while a current neutral said that, given government's continuing abuse of the designation process, the right to strike appears to be of little value.

Two of the neutrals were critical of the Treasury Board for its severe downsizing of its negotiation branch and for the inadequate training of those who remained after the downsizing. One of the two expressed concern that the people bargaining in the field have no statutory authority, while two of the former union officials bemoaned the loss of a bargaining system formerly based on trust and close personal relationships and mutual respect between union and management negotiators. A management representative warned, "Until we stop beating up on our people, we're going to have troubles."

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Appendix 2: Departments and Agencies Consulted

Departments Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency Canada Economic Development Canadian Centre for Management Development Canadian Heritage Canadian International Development Agency Citizenship and Immigration Canada Department of Finance Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Department of Justice Canada Environment Canada Fisheries and Oceans Health Canada Human Resources Development Canada Industry Canada National Defence Natural Resources Canada Privy Council Office Public Service Commission of Canada Public Works and Government Services Canada Solicitor General of Canada Statistics Canada Transport Canada Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat Veterans Affairs Canada Western Economic Diversification Canada Agencies Atomic Energy Control Board Canada Customs and Revenue Agency Canada Investment and Savings Canadian Food Inspection Agency Canadian Polar Commission Canadian Security Intelligence Service Indian Oil and Gas Canada Medical Research Council National Capital Commission National Energy Board National Film Board of Canada National Research Council Canada National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada Northern Pipeline Agency Canada Office of the Auditor General of Canada Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner Office of the Correctional Investigator Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada Parks Canada Agency Public Service Staff Relations Board Security Intelligence Review Committee Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada

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Appendix 3: Bargaining Agents Consulted

Aircraft Operations Group Association Association of Public Service Financial Administrators Canadian Air Traffic Control Association Canadian Association of Professional Radio Operators Canadian Merchant Service Guild Canadian Military Colleges Faculty Association Canadian Union of Professional and Technical Employees Council of Graphic Arts Unions of the Public Service of Canada Federal Government Dockyard Chargehands Association Federal Government Dockyard Trades and Labour Council (East) Federal Government Dockyard Trades and Labour Council (West) Local 2228, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Professional Association of Foreign Service Officers Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada Public Service Alliance of Canada Research Council Employees' Association The Social Science Employees Association

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Appendix 4 Hearings with Management Representatives

Assistant Deputy Ministers and Directors General, Human Resources Cardinal, Michel, Public Works and Government Services Canada Gosselin, Denis, Secretary to HR Council Pelletier, Jacques, Correctional Services Canada Plante, Monique, Human Resources Development Canada Roberts, Richard, Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission Siegel, Shirley, Canadian Food Inspection Agency Directors of Staff Relations Désilets, Robert, Correctional Services Canada Fennessy, Barry, Human Resources Development Canada Lahay, Audrey, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada Leduc, Janet, Fisheries and Oceans Canada Rumstein, Ilan, Health Canada Sullivan, Rick, National Defence APEX Representatives Bradet, Lucien, Industry Canada Emond, Bob, National Defence Frith, Rosaline, Citizenship and Immigration Canada Graham, Andrew, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (APEX's President) Maidens, Warren, Public Works and Government Services Canada Treasury Board Officials Berlin, Frank Duggan, Dennis Gagnon, Marc Gillespie, Gray Graham, Don Harder, V. Peter Langevin, Daniel Laurendeau, Hélène Nannini, Richard Wilder Patterson, Kathryn

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Appendix 5: Hearings with Bargaining Agents

Association of Public Service Financial Administrators Canadian Air Traffic Control Association Canadian Association of Professional Radio Operators Canadian Union of Professional and Technical Employees Federal Government Dockyard Trades and Labour Council (West) Local 2228, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Professional Association of Foreign Service Officers Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada Public Service Alliance of Canada The Social Science Employees Association

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Appendix 6: Template Interviewees

Template interviews were conducted with the following persons between January 2, 2000 and March 31, 2000.

Barnes, L.W.C.S.	Former President	Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada
Bernstein, Norman (deceased)	Director, Mediation Services	Public Service Staff Relations Board
Davidge, Des	Former General Secretary	National Joint Council
Dodge, David	Deputy Minister Former Deputy Minister	Health Canada Department of Finance Canada
Edwards, Claude	Former National President	Public Service Alliance of Canada
Fleury, Jean-Gu	Assistant Secretary to Cabinet (MPSP) Former Deputy Secretary Human Resources Branch	Privy Council Office Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat
Giroux, Bob	Former Secretary	Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat
Jolicoeur, Alain	Deputy Commissioner Former Chief Human Resources Officer	Canada Customs and Revenue Agency Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat
Lalonde, Fernand	General Secretary	National Joint Council
Quail, Ranald	Deputy Minister	Public Works and Government Services Canada
Tarte, Yvon	Chairperson	Public Service Staff Relations Board
Tenace, Lou	Former Vice-Chairperson Former Deputy Secretary Labour Relations	Public Service Staff Relations Board Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat

 

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Appendix 7: Bargaining Agent Membership

	Approximate Number of Employees in Bargaining Units
Aircraft Operations Group Association (AOGA)	423
Association of Public Service Financial Administrators (APSFA)	2,071
Canadian Air Traffic Control Association (CATCA)	11
Canadian Association of Professional Radio Operators (CAPRO)	338
Canadian Merchant Service Guild (CMSG)	823
Canadian Military Colleges Faculty Association (CMCFA)	124
Canadian Union of Professional and Technical Employees (CUPTE)	854
Council of Graphic Arts Unions of the Public Service of Canada (CGAU)	111
Federal Government Dockyard Chargehands Association (FGDCA)	70
Federal Government Dockyard Trades and Labour Council (West) (FGDTLC)	530
Federal Government Dockyard, Trades and Labour Council (East) (FGDTLC)	610
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW)	1,126
Professional Association of Foreign Service Officers (PAFSO)	998
Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada (PIPSC)	32,539
Public Service Alliance of Canada (PSAC)	122,248
Research Council Employees' Association (RCEA)	1,824
Social Science Employees Association (SSEA)	5,874
Total	170,574

Source: PSSRB 32nd Annual Report 1998-99/Data from TB at March 31, 1999

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Appendix 8: Committee Members and Staff

Fryer, John L. (Chair)

Members: Baker, Ercel Bean, Daryl T. Bouchard, Jean-Claude Duxbury, Linda Hynna, Martha Lewis, Dave MacLean, Catherine Paquet, Renaud Thompson, Mark

Committee Secretariat Driscoll, Penelope Desrochers, Francine Fawcett, Deborah (University of Victoria) Peirce, Jon

 

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1. Laurence Strong (Chair) First Report of the Advisory Committee on Senior Level Retention and Compensation. Ottawa: Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 1998, p.3. [Return]
2. Gene Swimmer and Sandra Bach, "Restructuring Federal Public Service Human Resources." In G. Swimmer (Ed.), Public Service Labour Relations in an Era of Restraint and Restructuring. Ottawa and London: Canadian Policy Research Networks and Oxford University Press, 2000 (publication pending), Table 7.1 [Return]
3. For a useful discussion, see Anthony Giles, "Globalization and Industrial Relations," in the Globalization of the Economy and the Worker: Selected Papers Presented at the 32nd Annual Industrial Relations Conference. Montreal: Canadian Industrial Relations Association, 1996. [Return]
4. See, among others, Graham Lowe, Grant Schellenberg, and Katie Davidman, "Re-Thinking Employment Relationships." Ottawa: Canadian Policy Research Networks, 1999, and A. Templer, T. Cawsey, and T. Stone, "The Human Resource Management Challenge of Contingent Workers," in Workplace Gazette, 2:3 (Fall, 1999). [Return]
5. Joseph Peters, An Era of Change: Government Employment Trends in the 1980s and 1990s. Ottawa: Canadian Policy Research Networks Study #W/03, 1999. [Return]
6. It must be noted that while the federal government workforce as a whole aged, the proportion of that workforce aged 55 and over also declined significantly between 1987 and 1997, presumably as a result of downsizing and early retirement initiatives. [Return]
7. Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Employment Statistics for the Federal Public Service. Ottawa: Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 1999. [Return]
8. These groups included financial officers, computer system specialists, mathe- maticians, statisticians, economists, and policy analysts. See p. 1-29, par. 1-68 of the 1998 report for a complete list. [Return]
9. This information was obtained from the Commission's Web site: http://www.jobs-emplois.gc.ca/menu/home_e.htm. [Return]
10. The public service is made up employees for whom the Treasury Board is the employer, and those employed by separate employers such as the Atomic Energy Control Board, the National Film Board and the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions. [Return]
11. The PSSRA does not use the term "union." It refers to an "employee association," defined as an "organization of employees the purposes of which include the regulation of relations between the employer and its employees." [Return]
12. PSSRA, s. 78(1)(a). [Return]
13. Treasury Board v. PSAC PSSRB February 7, 1997 (Chodos). [Return]
14. See Swimmer (1995:371-2). [Return]
15. PSSRA, s. 7. [Return]
16. The Government Employees Compensation Act sets out the rights of public service employees who are injured by work-related accidents or disabled by employment-related industrial disease. [Return]
17. Earlier PSSRB jurisprudence had rejected this argument, in part because the complaints procedure under the code was so lengthy and cumbersome that it could not properly be considered an alternate form of redress. See Yarrow v. TB (Agriculture and Agrifood) [1996] CPSSRB No. 10 (QL) 166-2-25034 . The most recent jurisprudence of the Federal Court is found in Mohamaned v. Canada (Treasury Board); O'Hagan v. Canada (Treasury Board); Boutilier v. Canada (Treasury Board) (1999), 181 D.L.R. 4th 590 (F.C.A.). Applications for Leave to the Supreme Court of Canada are pending. [Return]
18. These include race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, marital and family status, disability, and criminal conviction for which a pardon has been issued. [Return]
19. For a useful discussion, see Donald Carter, "The Duty to Accommodate: Its Growing Impact on the Grievance Process," in Relations Industrielles, 52(1), 1997. [Return]
20. The purpose of such associations is to promote the professions in question and to advance the interests of their members. They also regulate those professions. In general, they represent self-employed practitioners. Typically they are not legally entitled to bargain collectively with employers, though admittedly some have begun to engage in union-like forms of collective action (i.e., doctors' collective withdrawal of services to protest what they see as inadequate provincial government funding). Examples of professional associations would be the Ontario Bar Association and the Canadian Medical Association. In connection with professional associations, it is important to note that some groups that are legally certified trade unions continue to call themselves associations; this is quite often the case with university faculty unions. [Return]
21. The Civil Service Whitley Council was launched in Britain in 1919 as part of a broader movement toward joint industrial councils spearheaded by John Henry Whitley, Deputy Speaker of the House of Commons. The idea behind such councils was that effective industrial relations required strong organization on the part of both employers and employees. The British Whitley Councils were to have a broad impact across the industrialized world. Among other things, they were a major influence in the establishment of works councils in Germany in 1923. For a more detailed discussion, see Barnes (1975:7-14). [Return]
22. L.W.C.C. Barnes, Consult and Advise: A History of the National Joint Council of the Public Service of Canada, 1944-1974. Kingston: Queen's Industrial Relations Centre, 1975. See also George Sulzner, "The National Joint Council of the Public Service of Canada: A Vehicle for Bargaining and Dispute Resolution," in Journal of Collective Negotiations, 27:4 (1998). [Return]
23. Barnes, 1975. [Return]
24. L.W.C.S. Barnes, personal interview with Advisory Committee, January 19, 2000. [Return]
25. Three years earlier, Mr. Diefenbaker's Finance Minister, Donald Fleming, had unilaterally overturned the Civil Service Commission's recommendation of a pay increase, which had been supported by Pay Research Bureau (PRB) data. The reasons given for the rejection were the cost of the recommendations and Fleming's lack of confidence in the PRB's data. For more detail, see Barnes (1975:103-4). [Return]
26. Robert Armstrong, "Some Aspects of Policy Determination in the Development of the Collective Bargaining Legislation of the Government of Canada," in Canadian Public Administration, 2 (1968). [Return]
27. Gérard Hébert, "Public Sector Bargaining in Quebec: The Rise and Fall of Centralization," in G. Swimmer and M. Thompson, eds., Public Sector Collective Bargaining in Canada. Kingston: Queen's Industrial Relations Centre, 1995. [Return]
28. In Hansard, April 25, 1966. [Return]
29. Ibid. [Return]
30. Armstrong, 1968, p. 455. [Return]
31. Passed in 1935, the "Wagner Act" (the National Labor Relations Act) granted U.S. private sector workers the right to bargain collectively and to strike. The approach taken by the Act was generally arm's length and adversarial, featuring a clear separation of the interests of employers and workers. Management personnel were excluded from unions, and "company unions" were specifically forbidden. In recent years, the "Wagner Act" has come in for increasing criticism for failing to do more to promote labour-management cooperation. [Return]
32. Ibid. [Return]
33. Gene Swimmer, "Collective Bargaining in the Federal Public Service of Canada: The Past Twenty Years," in G. Swimmer and M. Thompson, eds., Public Sector Collective Bargaining in Canada, op.cit., p. 374. [Return]
34. Ibid., pp. 374-75. [Return]
35. Ibid., p. 386. [Return]
36. Ironically, inflation dropped so rapidly that in the second year of the controls program, federal public service employees' 5% increase was well above the average increases received by other private and public sector workers. See Swimmer (1995:384) for details. [Return]
37. Ibid. [Return]
38. Ibid., pp. 379-380. [Return]
39. Gene Swimmer and K. Kinaschuk, "Staff Relations under the Conservative Government: The Singers Change but the Song Remains the Same." In F. Abele, ed., How Ottawa Spends, 1992-93. Ottawa: Carleton Univ. Press, 1992. [Return]
40. Casual employees and those on term contracts of less than three months are not eligible for union membership. [Return]
41. This description of PS 2000 came not from the unions but from John Edwards, then the Chairman of the Public Service Commission. [Return]
42. Swimmer, 1995, p. 395. [Return]
43. Ibid., p. 400. [Return]
44. Swimmer and Bach, 2000. [Return]
45. See Gene Swimmer, "Introduction" and Gilles Paquet and Robert Shepherd, "The Program Review Process: A Deconstruction," both in G. Swimmer (ed.), How Ottawa Spends, 1996-97: Under the Knife. Ottawa: Carleton Univ. Press, 1996. [Return]
46. Not all of these jobs were actually lost, since a certain number of public service employees were transferred to newly created agencies like Nav Canada [Return]
47. See, among others, the Auditor General's Report for 1998. [Return]
48. Ian Lee and Clem Hobbs, "Pink Slips and Running Shoes: The Liberal Government's Downsizing of the Public Service," in G. Swimmer, ed., How Ottawa Spends, 1996-97, op. cit. [Return]
49. Swimmer and Bach, 2000. [Return]
50. Ibid. [Return]
51. See, among others, Jack Aubry, "Windfall 'A Long Time Coming' for Underpaid Workers," and Kathryn May, "Two Hundred Thousand Share in Landmark Award," both in Ottawa Citizen, July 30, 1998. [Return]
52. Swimmer and Bach, 2000. [Return]
53. Linda Duxbury, Lorraine Dyke, and Natalie Lam, Building a World-Class Workforce: Career Development in the Federal Public Service. Ottawa: Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 1999. [Return]
54. In all, 18% of those promoted and 23% of those not promoted said they were likely to leave the public service within the next year, while 23% of those promoted and 30% of those not promoted felt they were likely to leave their department within the next year. The precise figures were, for high commitment, 36% of those promoted within the past five years, and 28% of those not promoted. Overall, 72% of those promoted had still thought about leaving the public service—a figure only slightly lower than the 77% of those not promoted. [Return]
55. Specifically, 49% of all respondents find their workloads unreasonable, and 48% believe that the quality of their work suffers because they are having to do the same or more work with fewer resources. A full 56% believe they have little say in decisions and actions that affect their work, 45% do not believe that their immediate supervisor does a good job of helping them develop their careers, and 47% don't believe they stand a fair chance of getting a promotion, given their skills and experience. Only 37% believe that senior management will try to resolve the concerns raised in the survey. [Return]
56. PPF, Labour-Management Relations in the Federal Public Service. Ottawa: PPF, 1999 [Return]
57. Respondents were required to choose one of the following 5 choices for each of the 9 subjects of consultation: 1 = No labour-management interaction; 2 = Information exchange; 3 = Consultation but little consideration given to the union's point of view in the decision; 4 = Consultation with average consideration given to the union's point of view in the decision; 5 = Consultation with a great deal of consideration given to the union's point of view in the decision. [Return]
58. The average score for union representatives on this question was 4.0 on a 5-point scale. For management representatives, the average score was 2.4. [Return]
59. The specific survey question asked respondents to identify the three or four key issues having the greatest negative impact on workplace labour-management relations. [Return]
60. In the industrial relations literature, this phenomenon is commonly referred to as the "narcotic" effect. [Return]
61. Swimmer, 1995, and John Fryer, "Provincial Public Sector Labour Relations," in G. Swimmer and M. Thompson, eds., Public Sector Collective Bargaining in Canada, op. cit. [Return]
62. Robert Rogow, "The Structure of Collective Bargaining in Canada," in A. Sethi, Ed., Collective Bargaining in Canada. Scarborough: Nelson, 1989. [Return]
63. Allen Ponak and Mark Thompson, "Public Sector Collective Bargaining," in J. Anderson, M. Gunderson, and A. Ponak (eds.), Union-Management Relations in Canada. 2nd edition. Don Mills: Addison-Wesley, 1989. [Return]
64. In 1993, the PSSRA was amended to provide for the designation of positions rather than employees. As the PSSRB notes in Part III of its Main Estimates (p. 8), it had been anticipated that after the first round of bargaining under the amended process, the issue of designated employees for all subsequent rounds of bargaining would be limited to the review of a position which either had not been designated but which the employer feels should be designated, or which had been designated but which the bargaining agent felt should no longer be. In practice, however, this has not been the case. As the PSSRB notes, the amended provisions are "ambiguous, cumbersome and incomplete." In fact, the Treasury Board and the PSAC consider the provisions so inadequate that they have found it necessary, with the PSSRB's acquiescence, to come up with a process totally outside the provisions of the PSSRA. The process which the parties have come up with involves not only compiling a new list of designated positions, but also providing another notice to all employees, include those whose positions continue to be designated. [Return]
65. See Sec. 92(1) of the PSSRA for further details on this point. [Return]
66. Note that not all bargaining agents responding to the questionnaire answered every question. [Return]
67. One bargaining agent did not respond to this question. [Return]
68. Both union representatives interviewed are retired. [Return]

 

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